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The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi 
Vote The increase of electoral support of the Nazi party dur-
ing thc last years of the Weimar Republic is part of one of thc 
most dramatic instances of the breakdown of a democratic regime 
involving thc democratic proccss itself. Schotars studying this cra 
do not dispute the fact that economic conditions played a role in 
this proccss. What is disputed is what role economics played. 
Compcting interpretations range from those which assert that the 
breakdown resulted from the dissolution of former protective 
structurcs in the society to those which find nothing exceptional 
in the events, explaining them simply as a case in which the 
electorate punished thc governing parties for unsatisfactory per-
formance by voting for the opposition. What this latter view 
considers exceptional is only the character of the main opposition 
party, namely the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(NSDAP or National Socialist German Workers' Party), but not 
the fact that it gathered so many votes. Between these extremes 
we find intcrpretations which identify a Iasting change of voting 
patterns inside the boundaries of existing societal and ideological 
cleavages. This article confronts the competing interpretations and 
examincs thcir empirical bascs. Wc do not try to explain why the 
NSDAP was so successful in exploiting mass frustration at that 
particular time. Rathcr, we try to obtain information about the 
voting potential that it drew upon and in what way it did so. In 
short, we attempt to describe what happened, not why it hap-
pened. 
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THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Individual Choice The hypotheses that we discuss consider 
individual criteria, perceptions, and voting motivations to different 
degrees. None of them excludes the individual Ievel completely. 
For instance, although an assertion about eroding dass ties may 
bc testable by the exclusive use of aggregate data, it ncverthelcss 
contains conjectures about subjective changes in individual situ-
ations. The reference to individual situations is even more visible 
if wc talk about the punishment of governing parties or the 
radicalization of voters. In historical social rescarch, wc usually 
do not have access to survey data. Although our intcrpretations 
refer to individual actions which have collective consequences, they 
havc bcen formulated from data on aggregate behavior. In stating 
these interpretations, we have inferred individual behavior from 
aggregate behavior and individual motivations from visible indi-
vidual behavior. As long as this method of analysis is taken in 
cxplicit steps, it is possiblc to discuss whether our intcrpretations 
are mcrely speculations or testable hypotheses. Since Statements 
about aggregate behavior can be deduced from Statements about 
individual actions, but not the other way around, it is best to start 
from a conceptual model of individual voting decisions and to 
consider what conclusions can be drawn for the aggrcgatc Ievel. 
Then, by way of exclusion, we can decide what kind of individual 
actions arenot compatiblc with the aggrcgate data that wc possess. 
The conceptual model of individual voting that we use is a 
model of rational choice: we suppose that individual votcrs dcfine 
a situation in terms of the political and economic circumstances, 
the main problems, concepts for solving them, and thc positions 
of different parties with respect to these problems and their so-
lutions. We further suppose that the individual's choicc among 
parties depcnds on this dcfinition of thc situation. If someone 
decides not to vote or to vote for the same party under all cir-
cumstances, that individual rcprcsents a bordcrlinc case which 
nevertheless fits easily into our framework. In the first case, the 
positions of all of the competing parties are "too far" from the 
individual's position; in the sccond casc, all but one of the parties 
are "too far" from the individual's position. 
In analyzing the movemcnt of votcrs bctwcen partics, we use 
the following concepts: if the difference between two parties is a 
matter of principle to a voter, hc is not disposed to oscillate 
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bctween them, whatcvcr his personal satisfaction with general 
circumstances. If no principles are at stake in the choice between 
two parties, the voter fecls free to altemate between them ac-
cording to his general satisfaction. If the voter is confronted with 
a multiparty systcm, the numbcr of dimcnsions and thc salience 
of the dimensions by which he orders the system determine his 
options. In this sense, the fewer principles the voter's frame of 
reference contains, thc lcss rcstricted are his options for rewarding 
and punishing the political parties. The more principles are in-
volved, thc morc rcstrictcd are his options. The extreme case is 
the voter who places all parties in a frame of reference where all 
dimensions are of fundamental importance--he is the true loyal 
"dient." The description of the eieetarate in these terms is 
straightforward. If thcrc are no individuals with framcs of rcfer-
ence, then movements in any direction will be possible. lf indi-
viduals have frames of reference, but very personal ones, the 
picture will be the same at thc aggregatc Ievel: the eieetarate can 
be characterized as disoriented, but not the individuals, as in the 
first case. lf there arc groups of individuals who share frames of 
reference, then there will be some order in the movement between 
partics, and the clcctoratc can bc characterized as structured. 
But how can we draw inferences from aggregate data to 
individual actions? If scvcrc economic depression can bc consid-
ered a valence issue, then we can start from the assumption that 
only vcry fcw individuals have economic reasons to be satisfied 
with the present government. The aggregate fluctuations (which 
we intcrpret as reactions to the economic crisis) then give us hints 
ab out thc salicnce of positional differences among parties for the 
voters. These positional differences may or may not contain eco-
nomic themes thcmsclves. Figure 1 illustrates this point by show-
ing a system of four parties (A,B,C,D) which differ from each 
Fig. 1. Party Positions in a Two-Dimensional lssue Space 
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other along two positional dimensions (dimension I with the 
positions Ia and lb, and dimension li with the positions lla and 
llb). 
If we do not find major movements of votes among the 
parties, then we have to conclude that both dimensions are suf-
ficiently salient for the total electorate to prevent any reactions to 
the economic crisis, whatever the amount of economic dissatis-
faction. If we find ßuctuations between A and C, on the one 
hand, and B and C, on the other, but no fluctuations between A 
and B or C and D, then positional differences along dimension li 
do not prevent movement, whereas diffcrences along dimension 
I do. In this case, we have to considcr dimension I as "salicnt," 
as a matter of principle, but not dimension II. The reverse is true 
if we find only "horizontal" but no "vcrtical" movemcnts. If therc 
are only "diagonal" movements, we have to conclude that for thc 
total eieetarate positional differences are salient but that the di-
mensions are not independent from each other, and so on. If we 
find that movements are random, that therc is no structure at all, 
then the electorate cannot be characterized by positional conccpts-
at least not by the ones used in our classification of party positions. 
No inference is possible in this last casc concerning the presence 
or absence of framcs of reference for individuals. 
To understand the societal mcaning of a party systcm, it is 
not sufficient to Iook at official party positions. It is necessary to 
find out whether thcre is some structure in the movement of 
voters among parties. If no structure can bc dctccted, thcn thcre 
is no socictal Counterpart to party positions. If structure exists, it 
may be possible to describe it in tcrms of official party positions, 
but not always. The description of movements betwccn parties 
allows us to draw inferences about the salicncc of motivcs in the 
electorate, and about the way economic strain is mediated polit-
ically. If the direction of movemcnt changcs over time or if it is 
changed by the appearance of a new party, wc can trace that 
change in voting critcria. It is possible to tell which dimensions 
of the positional system are associatcd with the success or failure 
of a new contender. In this sense, onc can talk of the reasons for 
changcs in the party landscape. 
Frcquently, explanations of voting behavior refer only im-
plicitly to subjective situations and instcad usc objcctive properties 
of individual situations as independent variables. The outstanding 
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cascs are properties of the economic and social structure. This 
direct explanatory conncction bctween objcctivc propcrties of sit-
uations and voting behavior amounts to the strong assertion of a 
strict determination of subjective situations by objective situa-
tions: lt is said that all individuals whose objective situations are 
identical also perceive those situations as identical and evaluate 
them by identical standards. Only if this is the casc can objectivc 
properties of situations safely be used as shortcuts in explaining 
individual bchavior. Howcvcr, if we find definite Connections 
between voting behavior and certain objective properties of in-
dividual situations, wc can validly infcr that somehow individual 
perceptions and evaluations are associated with objective situa-
tions. Changcs in thesc conncctions then indicate changes in in-
dividual perceptions and/or evaluations, even if we cannot deter-
mine the nature of thesc changcs. Therefore, it is legitimatc to 
explain electoral change by objective situational explanations, as 
long as we keep in mind that these explanations do not tcll us 
what happencd at the individual Ievel but only that something 
must have happened. Some interpretations of the development of 
voting behavior during thc Weimar Republic use explanations of 
this kind only, whereas others additionally try to reconstruct thc 
dcvclopmcnt on thc Ievel of individual motives and decisions 
explicitly. 
Electoral Change Elcctoral changc is describcd here by 
three sets of concepts: first, there may be changes in the social 
basis of the party system; second, changes may bc the rcsult 
of the rise of new issues combined with new patterns of party 
clientship or they may be the result simply of the perccption of 
ncw rcward/punishmcnt options (without a Iasting change in 
party identification); third, changes may affect only new votcrs 
or the whole elcctoratc. 
Thc first sct of concepts is used by hypotheses which assert 
changing social or ideological cleavages. Conccrning thc risc of 
new parties, one might discern the following cases: (I) the cleav-
age structure remains intact, and the ncw party can bc placcd 
insidc thc cxisting dcavage structure; (2) for previously existing 
parties the dcavage structure is unchanged, but the new party 
manages to compete outside its boundarics; (3) a ncw dcavage 
structurc dcvelops, and the new party takes its place in this new 
structure; (4) the cleavages dissolve altogether, and the new party 
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competes, as do all other parties, for votes from an amorphaus 
electorate. 
Up to this point what we have considercd is knowlcdgc of 
the kind one would use in objective situational explanations. If 
we want to ask questions about the "meaning" of change for thc 
voters, we have to expand the focus of our explanations to the 
. Ievel of subjective situations. In particular, we might ask whethcr 
changing party strength at the ballot box should be interpreted as 
the development of a new stability (the development of new 
Iasting loyalties) or as ernerging instability (the development of 
new reward/punishment options). Thosc voters of thc NSDAP 
for whom opposition to existing institutions was or bccame a 
matter of principle, we call radical NS-voters; voters of the 
NSDAP for whom the existing institutions did not posc a prob-
lern of principle, we call protest NS-voters. Radicalization should 
appcar on the aggregate Ievel in strongly onc-sidcd movcments 
of voters from other parties to the NSDAP; protest should appear 
in fluctuations in both directions, depending on economic devel-
opments and the governmental responsibilities of parties. 
The last set of conccpts examines the time dimcnsion of 
electoral change. If changes affect only the social basis of a party, 
not its voters, that is, if former non-votcrs or ncw votcrs arc thc 
source of change, we call the process "mobilization" (in thc case 
of former non-voters) or "crosion" (in the case of new voters). 
In addition, if previous voters change their behavior, thc process 
is called "dissolution." Dissolution and mobilization indicate im-
mediate change, whereas erosion indicates a gradual process. In 
the case of erosion, much smallcr changes in electoral Outcomes 
are significant with respect to the prospects of the party system 
than in the case of dissolution or mobilization. Although the 
distinction between mobilization and crosion is theoretically 
meaningful, we---because of the nature of our data-consider only 
the case of dissolution and a combincd casc of mobilization and 
erosiOn. 
LEADING INTERPRETATIONS OF ELECTORAL CHANGE 
Overview The following hypotheses provide the bases for 
the leading interpretations of the clcctoral changcs that took place 
during the Weimar years. 
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Mass hypothcses: According to writers such as Arendt, 
Bendix, and Kornhauser, the NSDAP was a mass movement that 
was made possiblc by the dissolution of former binding ties and 
separating cleavages. In this view, the economic crisis simply 
activated what had already occurred on a deeper Ievel. The social 
structure which formcd subjective situations had lost its power; 
a mass society with growing political lability had taken its placc; 
it was a time for "movcmcnts" instead of parties. Among advo-
cates of these hypotheses, some stress the phenomenon of general 
disorientation; others stress the "politicization of the unpolitical." 
The first version is referred to here as the dissolution version, the 
second as the mobilization/ erosion version. 1 
Realignment hypothesis: Meckstroth puts forward a re-
alignment interpretation of the development. He defines realign-
ment as persistent changes in voting behavior. According to him, 
the critical elections took placc between 1928 and 1932. His in-
terest centers less on the fact of realignment than on its causes. 
The explanation he favors is a "valcnce issue model": thc change 
was brought about not by positional rearrangements but by a 
dominaring valence issue, the cconomic crisis. What started out 
as punishment behavior was transformed by the persistence of the 
crisis into new patterns of bcha vior. 2 
Class hypotheses: According to Burnham, Shively, 
Geiger, and Lipsct, thc NSDAP was a class-based party. Thc 
different interpretations all agree that the NSDAP vote came 
1 For a general discussion, see Loren K. Waldman, "Models of Mass Movements. The 
Case ofthe Nazis," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Univ. ofChicago, 1973). Forthe mass hypothesis, 
sec Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951); Reinhard Bcndix, 
"Social Stratification and Political Power," American Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), 
357-375; William Kornhauser, The Polilics of Mass Society (London, 1959). For "dissolu-
tion," see ibid., I02-IIJ; for "mobilization/erosion," see ibid., 177-182; ßendix, "Social 
Stratification," 37 I. Fora discussion of the mass hypothescs, sec also Bcrnc Hagtvct, "Thc 
Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Re-examination," 
in Stein U. Larsen, et al. (eds.), f.Vho Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism 
(Bergen, 1980), 66-1 17; Falter, "Radicalization of the Middle Classcs or Mobilization of 
the Unpolitical? The Theories of Seymour Mactin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix on the 
Electoral Support of the NSDAP in the Light of Recent Research," Social Scitmce Infor-
mation, II (1981), 389-430. 
2 The term "critical election" was introduced by Vladimir 0. Kcy in "A Thcory of 
Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, XVII (1955), 3-18. See Theodore W. Meckstroth, 
"Conditions of Partisan Realignments: A Srudy of Electoral Change,'' unpub. Ph.D. diss. 
(Univ. of Minnesota, 1971). 
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predominantly from thc Protestant middlc dass. Shivcly and 
Geiger interpret the success of the NSDAP as an unstable phe-
nomenon: the crisis made the NSDAP attractive for middlc-class 
votcrs, but in better times they might weil have returned to their 
formcr partics (this interpretation is refcrred to here as "middlc-
class-protest"). Both Burnham and Lipset present variants of what 
in our terminology arc radicalization hypothescs. In Burnham's 
vicw, the Protestant middle dass lacked thc stablc pattems of 
party identification that existed for the Catholic and the working-
class segments of thc population. Economic strcss hclpcd thc 
NSDAP to establish itself as the middle-class party as had the 
Zentrum/Bayerische Volkspartei (Zentrum/BVP or Catholic 
Center Party/Bavarian People's Party) for the Catholics and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD or German Social 
Democrarie Party) or the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
(KPD or German Communist Party) for thc workers (rcfcrrcd to 
as "middle-class-formation"). For Lipset, the NSDAP's success 
was the consequence of the radicalization of an alrcady cxisting 
middle-class ideology (referred to as "middle-class-ideological-
radicalization "). 3 
Mixed-causes hypothesis: Our own interpretation, in 
cantrast to the previous hypotheses, explicitly takes into account 
the possibility that the movement of voters to the NSDAP might 
have been the conscquence of different "subjective situations" in 
different sectors of the society. Wehave labclcd this intcrprctation 
as "middle-class radicalization plus working-class protest": there 
was a stable transfer of middle-class voters toward the NSDAP, 
whcreas the working dass cast its bailots for the NSDAP largely 
as a protest. 4 
Reconstruction Thc aspccts of change introduced in the 
previous section can be rcformulatcd with rcspcct to the NSDAP 
as follows: 
3 See Walter D. Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism. The 
United States and Weimar Germany," Journal of Interdiscip/inary History, 111 (1972), I-]o; 
Theodor Geiger, "Panik im Mittelstand," Die Arbeit, Vlll (1930), 6r9-635; Seymour M. 
Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, r96o); W. Phillips Shivcly. "Party !dentification, Party 
Choice and Voting Stabilicy. The Weimar Case," Ameritan Polilüal Science Review, LXVI 
(I972), f20]-I225. 
4 See Falter, "Unemployment and thc Radicalization oftheGerman Electorate, 1928-
I9JJ," in Pcter Stachura (cd.), Unemployment in Germany, 1919-r945 (London, r986), r87-
209; idem and Dirk Hänisch, "Die Anfilligkeic von Arbeitern gegenüber der NSDAP 
f928-I9JJ," Archiv jiJ.r Sozialgeschichte, XVI (r986), r77-2r6. 
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(r) The possible correspondencc of the party system and especially 
the NSDAP with properties of the social structure can present itself 
in four different ways: (a) there are no connections for the NSDAP 
and connections for established parties are vanishing, (b) Connec-
tions persist for all of the other parties, but are irrelevant for rhe 
NSDAP; (c) connections persist and are partly relevant for the 
NSDAP; (d) Connections persist and are as relevant for the NSDAP 
as for any other party: the NSDAP can be placed perfectly in the 
old clea vage structure. 
(2) Movements toward the NSDAP can be restricted to former 
non-vorers and new voters, or they can also include those who 
vored before. 
(3) Movements of voters between the NSDAP and other parries 
or the group of former non-voters and new vorers can be one-
sided (only toward the NSDAP) or two-sided (also back to the 
other parties and non-voters), or one-sided for some parties and 
two-sided for other parties. 
This rcformulation rcsults in a 4 X 2 X 3 matrix of possiblc 
combinations. If, for the sake of simplicity, we put the dimension 
of dissolution vs. crosion/mobilization inside the cells of thc 
multidimensional classification, we get a scheme as depicted in 
Figure 2. Cell ra would be consistent with the following hypoth-
Fig. 2. Dimensions of Change 
Relevance of 
Social Structure 
for Party Votc 
generally 
vanishing 
abscnt only 
for NSDAP 
partly valid 
also for NS 
valid for NS as 
for other parties 
a = all voters 
Direction of Movement 
one-sided two-sided mixed 
ra 2a 3• 
b b b 
4• sa 6a 
b b b 
7a Ra 9a 
b b b 
wa rra rza 
b b b 
b = only former non-voters/new voters 
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esis. The growth of the Naziparty was the product of a complcte 
and immediate dissolution of all dcavage lines, and it was a 
radicalization process. In contrast, cell 12a would tell the follow-
ing story. The growth of the NSDAP took place inside the bound-
aries of the existing cleavage structure; it was restricted to one 
segment of this structure; in this segment it attractcd formcr 
voters as weil as former non-voters/new voters; and the former 
voters of some parties were radicalized, whereas thc form er votcrs 
of some other parties voiced protest only temporarily by voting 
for the NSDAP. 
Instead of commenting at length on all of the other possible 
cases, we analyze how the four hypotheses discusscd prcviously 
fit in this classification system. 
Mass hypotheses; All developments in thc first two rows 
of the classification are consistent with mass hypotheses in gen-
eral. Cases in the first row would be extreme variants of thesc 
hypotheses, which are not put forward in the Iiterature on the 
Weimar Republic; thercfore cells 4, 5, and 6 remain to bc consid-
ered. Directions of movement arenot explicitly asscrtcd, but since 
the non-programmatic charactcr of "movements" is frcquently 
stressed, one would expect "protest" rather than "radicalization," 
that is, movements to and from the Nazi party, depcnding on 
general satisfaction. Both versions of the hypothesis, its dissolu-
tion version ("general trend of mass society") and its mobilization 
version ("politicization of the unpolitical") then would have tobe 
placed in cells sa and sb respectively. 
Realignment hypothesis: The realignment hypothcsis, as 
Mcckstroth puts it, does not fit weil into our scheme. First, since 
Meckstroth defines realignment mainly with rcspcct to party 
strength, not with respect to cleavages, the dimension "social 
basis" is not relevant to his hypothesis. Also, thc dimcnsion "di-
rcction of movement" is not helpful: since the valence issue of 
world economic crisis first brought about instability and thcn, 
through habitualization, new stability, it is not the direction, but 
the strength of the movcmcnt which counts. There should be 
markedly higher electoral volatility betwccn 1928 and 1932 than 
before and after this period. 5 
5 At best, one might exclude the fourth row, since Meckstroth also states that voter 
movements after 1928 transcended traditional divisions ("Partisan Realignments," 192). 
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Class hypotheses: These hypotheses are consistent with 
the fourth row of the classification. Middle-class-protest conforms 
with cell I I: the growth of the NSDAP should be accompanied 
by Iasting volatility of voters. According to Geiger, the mobili-
zation version of middlc-class-protest (I I b) is more likely to be 
truc than the dissolution version (IIa). Middle-class-formation 
and middle-class-ideological-radicalization are both consistent 
with cell IOa of thc classification systcm. Radicalization in Lipset's 
terms denotes an ideological process which affects the liberal 
segments of thc middlc dass to a greater degrce than it does the 
conservativc scgments. In contrast, Burnham does not imply any 
ideological roots of the movement. Therefore, middle-class-ideo-
logica]-radica]ization should appear in consistently strongcr 
movements from Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP or German People's 
Party) and Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP or German 
Democrarie Party) and to the NSDAP than from the Deutsch-
nationale Volkspartei (DNVP or German National People's 
Party), whereas "middle-class-formation" should reveal no such 
diffcrcnccs. 
Mixed-causes hypotheses: The variant of conceivable 
mixed-causcs hypothcscs which is addressed here is consistent 
with ceJl 9a of the classification: the dcavage structure is relevant 
for the NSDAP insofar as it draws its vote mainly, but not 
cxclusively, from the Protestant middle dass; there is also a strong 
influx of working-dass votes. Votes from the old middle-class 
parties remain with the NSDAP; votes from SPD and KPD fluc-
tuatc, dcpcnding on generat economic conditions. The protcstant 
middle dass voted NS because of its ideology; workers voted NS 
in spite of its ideology. 
Operational de.finitions At this junction we have to discuss 
what the data have to Iook like to be able to corroborate or refute 
the hypotheses mcntioncd. On the one hand, data on the social 
bases of parties and their change are needed; on the other band, 
we need data on the ftuctuations of voters between parties. 
The social basis of parfies and the place of the NSDAP For 
every election a cross tabulation of parties vs. societal segments 
is nccdcd. Thc cntry in cell (i,j) of thesc tables gives the perccntagc 
of the voters in segment i which voted for party j in the election 
under consideration. To make the following distinctions easier to 
understand we will work with a numerical example. Thc situation 
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in the first clection may have the properties illustrated in Figure 
3. If what happened was a complete vanishing of the existing 
cleavage structure, then the variance of the entries in each column 
has to decrease from election to election until fmally all of thc 
entries in a givcn column have the same value. In the final election 
under study the picture would have to Iook like Figure 4a. In this 
example, r 5 percent of the total population voted for party I and 
dass segment was irrelevant. If the cleavage structure was irrel-
evant for the NSDAP only, but remairred intact as far as other 
Fig. 3· First Election 
societal 
segment 
I 
2 
3 
I 
So 
20 
0 
party 
2 
20 
8o 
!0 
Fig. 4· Electoral Change 
4a: Complete Destruction of Tics 
party 
2 
!5 20 25 
segment 2 15 20 25 
15 20 2S 
4c: Partial Relevance for NSDAP 
NS 
40 
40 
40 
2 NS 
70 !O 0 20 
segment 2 !0 6o 0 JO 
0 0 so so 
3 NS 
0 0 
0 0 
So !0 
4b: Partial Dcsrruction of Ties 
party 
2 NS 
so 10 0 40 
10 so 0 40 
0 10 50 40 
4d: NSDAP Can Be Placed Perfectly 
2 NS 
So 20 0 0 
15 So 0 5 
0 0 ]0 70 
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parties are concerncd, thc variance in each column except that 
headed by the NSDAP would be marked as is shown in Figure 
4b. A case of partial rclcvance of the dcavage system for the 
NSDAP would show some variance also for the NSDAP, but 
definitely less than for other parties as shown by Figure 4c. 
Finally, the NSDAP ftts pcrfectly into the existing dcavage struc-
ture if it, like the other parties, is definitely confined to one 
segmcnt of the structure (sec Figure 4d). 
Fluctuations between parlies For every pair of consccutive 
clections a cross tabulation of parties at time ti vs. parties at time 
t2 is needed. The raw data consist of tables in which cell (i,j) 
gives thc numbcr of votcrs who switched their vote from party i 
to party j between thc elections. If we build percentages on the 
basis of thc elcctoratc in toto, cell (i,j) gives the same information 
as the raw data: it informs us about the strength ofthe flows among 
the parties. If we havc three parties, I, 2, and 3, with 50, 40, and 
IO pcrcent of the vote at time ti and 51, 33, and I6 percent of 
the vote at time t2, the tablc for these clections might Iook as 
shown in Figure sa. If we build row percentages, cell (i,j) givcs 
information on thc disposition of the voters of i at time ti to switch 
thcir vote to party j in the next election. 
In our example, the figure would havc to Iook like Figure 
sb. These two ways ofpresenting the data reveal different prop-
erties of movement. For instance, to call the NSDAP the "party 
of the unpolitical," as is donc in the mobilization/erosion version 
of our hypotheses, could mean that the disposition of thc unpol-
itical to vote for thc NSDAP was stronger than this disposition 
of any other group of voters. It could also mean that the flow of 
Fig. 5· Percentages 
sa: Total Perrentages 
t2 
2 
40 5 
tr 2 8 28 
3 0 
s 
4 
7 
sb: Row Perrentages 
t2 
So IO 
20 70 
JO 0 
IO 
IO 
70 
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votes from former nonvoters to the NSDAP was greater than this 
flow from any other party. If, in our numerical example, party I 
is the NSDAP and "party" 3 is the nonvoters, then the first 
meaning of the hypothesis is consistcnt with the data-bccausc 
3, I (30 percent) is greater than 2, I (20 percent)-but not the 
second-because 3, I (3 percent) is smaller than 2, I (8 percent). 
Similarly differcnces arise conceming the question of whethcr 
movements are one-sided or two-sided. In our illustration, the 
disposition 3, I is clearly greater than the rcversc disposition I,3-
30 percent compared to IO percent. This shift from party 3 to 
party I Iooks rather one-sided. If we comparc the strength of 
flow, we see that 3, I contains only 3 percent of the vote whereas 
I ,3 contains 5 percent and that thcrc is actually a nct flow of votcs 
from I to 3. 
We must be precise in our operational dcfinitions of what is 
meant by movements between parties. Since the hypotheses dis-
cussed seek to cxplain the development of the NSDAP from its 
beginnings to the end of the Weimar Republic, we have to use 
information on the strength of fluctuations and the disposition of 
groups not for isolated pairs of elections but for the whole se-
gucncc. The opcrational definitions for our analysis are as follows: 
Mobilization/erosion vs. dissolution 
Extreme mobilization. Former nonvoters are the majority of NS-
voters for most elections. 
Moderate mobilization. Former nonvoters are the greatest single 
gtoup of NS-voters; their disposition to vote NS is stronger than 
that of any other group for most elcctions. 
Weak mobilization. Former nonvoters either have the highest dis-
position to vote NS or are thc largcst singlc group for most 
elcctions, but not both. 
Dissolution. Former nonvoters arc neither thc largest nor the most 
strongly disposed group of voters with respect to thc NSDAP. 
Radicalization vs. Protest. (Only the two extremes arc dcscribcd 
hcrc.) 
Radicalization. The former voters of a party i are radicalized with 
respcct to thc NSDAP if 
party i grows smaller from clection to clcction; 
the loyalty ofits voters as mcasurcd by (i,i) is low and diminishing; 
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the disposition (i, NS) is rising and reaches a high rank in com-
parison with the disposition to switch to third parlies or to stay 
with i; 
this rise is not balanced by an equal reduction of the disposition to 
vote for other radical parties such as the NSDAP (KPD, DNVP), 
except i is classified as a radical party itself; 
the disposition (i,NS) is higher than the disposition (NS,i), exccpt 
for a last stage in which the vote for i comes only from a few true 
believers and those who fluctuate randomly between i and the 
NSDAP. 
Protest. Thc former votcrs of i shifted to the NSDAP mainly for 
protest if: 
thc sharc of thc vote of party i is rclativcly stable; 
the loyalty of its voters is high and stable; 
the disposition (i,NS) is moderate but substantial; it may rank high 
in comparison to the dispositions to switch to third parties, but 
the combined dispositions to switch to radical parties (NSDAP, 
KPD, DNVP) do not grow; 
disposition (i,NS) is not generally higher than disposition (NS,i). 
If a party is stable and has loyal followers, and the dispositions 
of its followcrs to switch to the NSDAP are low and symmetric, 
then neither radicalization nor protest has happened in respect to 
the NSDAP-thc votcrs of this party are simply not affcctcd by 
thc existence of the NSDAP. 
DATE BASE AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Date base for our analysis Our empirical analysis is based 
on two data scts. The fmt was originally derivcd from the ICPSR 
Weimar Election File. The second data set, containing fcwer var-
iables but a greater number of cases, carries information on the 
4,000 to 5,000 communities of the Reich with more than 2,000 
inhabitants. lt contains about 200 va.riablcs, mainly clcctoral data 
for all Reichstag elections between 1920 and 1933, with the un-
fortunate exception of the two 1932 elections and some valuablc 
social, cconomic, and sociocultural information on the commu-
nity Ievel. 6 
6 Since the CCPSR Weimar Election File data set contains virtually thousands of minor 
and rnajor errors, we had to reconstruct our own county data set from scratch. For this 
purpese we used the relevant volumes of Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (Berlin, I920-T934) 
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Both data sets, as is the case with the ICPSR file, can bc uscd 
for analytical purposes only if one adjusts the units for boundary 
changes, which occurred in Weimar Germany with considerablc 
frequency. Since these boundary changes did not follow a random 
pattern but took place mainly in the more urbanized and econom-
ically active regions of the Reich, serious distortions result if onc 
docs not neutralize their effect when creating county or com-
munity units which are stable over time. This rcstriction is oftcn 
ovcrlooked or treated in a rather cavalier fashion in the existing 
Iiterature on the Nazi voteJ But, without such adjustmcnts, it is 
not advisable to combine census and election data from different 
years. When we made the necessary adjustments, the number of 
cases in our county data set shrank by over 25 percent, from 
about 1,200 to 865. The problems created by boundary changes 
arc cvcn more serious for community data filcs if one does not 
restriet the adjustment procedure to pairs of elections. 8 
Research techniques All four of the hypothcses cxamined in 
this article imply individual-level relations. This kind of infor-
mation is not available for the Weimar pcriod. Thc only data 
existing are aggregate data. As a result, we must rely on per-
centages of parties or social indicators which are availablc only 
on a county or community Ievel. Using this information, we are 
able to specify, for example, that thc NSDAP farcd much better 
between 1930 and 1933 in Protestant than in Catholic counties, 
that therc is a negative corrclation bctwccn uncmployment figurcs 
and the Nazi share of the votc, and that there is a strong associ-
plus a multitude of other printed sources, such as unemployment statistics, fiscal reports, 
and so forth. The county data set now contains about 650 variables, among them some 
2DO-]OO containing information on all Weimar Reichstag and presidential elections plus 
the two referenda on the expropriation of the former ruling princcs ("Fürstenenteignung") 
and on the Young Plan concerning the payment of reparations. The rest of the variables 
are social, econornic, and cultural indicators ofche 1,200 counties ofthe Weimar Republic. 
The second data set is distributed by Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Bach-
emer Strasse 40, 5 Köln 40, Federal Republic of Germany. 
7 Same examples are discussed in Falterand Wolf 0. Gruner, "Minor and Major Flaws 
of a Widely Used Data Set: The ICPSR 'German Weimar Republik Data 1919-1933' 
Under Scrutiny," Historical Social Research, 20 (1981), 4-26. 
8 For this reason the ecologica1 rcgrcssion analysis rcported in Table 4 is based on such 
pairs of elections. The community data set, which in its raw form contains about 6,ooo 
communities (all communities with 2,000 inhabitants and more plus the county-based 
means for all communities wich less than 2,000 inhabitants), is thus reduced to about 4,000 
community units. 
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ation bctwcen thc Iosses of the middlc-class parties and the na-
tional-socialist vote gains. What we would like to know, however, 
is information such as thc perccntagc of Ca rholies and non-Cath-
olics voting NSDAP in 1930 and the share of unemployed blue-
collar workers voting for Adolf Hitler between 1928 and 1933. 
The most common yet seldom applied statistical technique to 
infer individual-lcvcl data from aggregate data is ecological regres-
sion analysis. 9 
Our analysis, as far as the individual Ievel is concerned, was 
based on this tcchnique. Unfortunatcly, ecological regrcssion 
analysis works only if some rather strong statistical assumptions 
arc mct by the data. Some of thcse assumptions (the Standard 
assumptions of regression analysis such as linearity) can be tested 
by means of aggregate data. Other assumptions, including thosc 
which permit inference from aggregate to individual Ievel rela-
tions, cannot bc tcstcd by aggregate data alone or can be tested 
only under very special circumstances. The most important of 
these spccial assumptions of ecological regression analysis is that 
the slope of the regression line of each pair of variables undcr 
considcration is thc samc between the individual units as it is 
between the aggregate units; that is, no systematic contextual 
effects are permitted. Only random variation around the regres-
sion line is acceptable. From empirical evidence, wc know that 
the assumption of noncontextuality is unrealistic in many in-
stances. Therefore, it seemcd reasonable to control our rcgrcssion 
equation for potentially disturbing factors such as confession or 
urbanization. We thus might bc ablc to neutralize, at least in part, 
unwelcome nonlinearities. Our findings are based on such an 
cxtcnsion of thc dassie ccological regression technique. Further-
more, we weighted each county unit by its population or numbcr 
of cligiblc votcrs in order to control for extreme variations in 
population figures. Finally, we applied a proportional fitting pro-
cedure to any negative estimators that arise since negative per-
centages do not exist in reality. 10 There is, however, no guarantce 
9 See Jan-Bernd Lohmöller and Falter, "Same Further Aspects of Ecological Regression 
Analysis,"" Quality and Quantity, XX (1986). 109-125. 
10 Although the transition probabilities for the clections between 1920 and 1928 wcrc 
calculated on the basis of our Weimar Community Data Set wirhaut the use of control 
variables, the 1928 to 1933 transition probabilities as weil as the voting propensitics ofthc 
two confessions and thc different social strata were calculated on the basis of the 86 5 
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for a total elimination of bias from our findings. Our statistical 
approach is rational in that it is based on an explicit statistical 
model and not simply on hindsight or the Straightforward infer-
ence from simple bivariate ecological correlations or the aggrc-
gate-level regressions to individual-level relations that appears so 
often in research on the Nazi electorate. 11 
FINDINGS 
The social basis of the NSDAP The realignment hypothesis 
is not discussed here since Meckstroth defines realignment mainly 
in respcct to interparty fluctuations and not social cleavages. Con-
cerning the other hypotheses, we find the following evidence (see 
tablcs r, 2, and 3). In thcir "dissolution" version, the mass hy-
potheses assert that there will be at least a reduction of the inner 
social variance of the NSDAP between 1928 and 1933 ("social 
cleavages are irrelevant for all parties" or "social cleavages are 
irrelevant for the NSDAP only"). Both on an aggregatc and on 
an (inferred) individual Ievel, it can be shown that neither the 
moderate nor the strong version of the mass hypotheses is covered 
by our data. Neither the NSDAP nor the other partics became 
socially less distinct over time. Although the social basis of the 
othcr parties changed little betwccn 1928 and 1933, thc NSDAP 
became relatively less "white collar" and slightly more "self-
employed" than it had been up to 1930. This changc implies that 
the social structure was, in our terms, at least partially relevant 
for the NSDAP vote and that the trend went in the wrong direc-
tion. 
The other two hypotheses arc consistcnt with our data to a 
much high er degree. Since all three sub-types of the middle-class 
county units of our Weimar Republic County Data Set according to an exrension of the 
"classic" model of ecological regression analysis using urbanization and religious denom-
ination as control variables in order to neutralize possible contextual effects. For details, 
sec Lohmöller et al., "Unemploymcnt and the Risc of National Socialism: Contradiering 
Resulrs from Different Regional Aggregations,'' in Pcrcr NUkamp (cd.), Measuring the 
Urlmeasurable (Boston, 1985), 3 57-370. Negative estimators or values above 100 were 
squeezed into the o-roo% interval by an iterative proportional fitting procedure. 
I I For those feeling uncornfortable with the method, some aggregatc correlations are 
reported in Falterand Hänisch, "Anf::illigkcit"; Falter, "Thc National-Socialist Mobilization 
of New Voters," in Thomas Childers (ed.), The Formation ~fthe i\Jazi Constituency, 1919-
1933 (London. 19RJ\). 202-231; Falter, "'Der Auf.<tieg der NSDAP in Franken bei den 
Reichstagswahlen 1924-1933," Cerman Studies Rwiew, IX (1986), 293-318. 
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hypothesis assert that the NSDAP vote came primarily from the 
Protestant middle dass, we analyzcd thc denaminational and the 
dass basis of the NSDAP. It should be significantly stronger 
arnong non-Catholics than arnong Catholics, among the middle-
dass electorate than among the blue-collar workers, and among 
Protestant in comparison to Catholic middle-class voters. Fur-
thermore, there should be no significant differences between 
Catholic and non-Catholic blue-collar workers. 
These cxpectations are rnet by our data with two notable 
exceptions: non-Catholic blue-collar workers displayed a stronger 
affinity toward thc NSDAP than their Catholic counterparts; and 
Catholic white-collar workers and civil servants voted NSDAP 
somewhat morc frcqucntly than non-Catholic membcrs of the 
salaried middle dasses (see Tables I and 2). Furtherrnore, the 
differencc bctwccn thc affinity of white- and blue-collar workcrs 
for the NSDAP is smaller than might be expected. It is the self-
ernployed, not thc salaried, Protestant middle dasses who showed 
a strong and disproportionally incrcasing sympathy for thc Hitler 
movement. In other words, the middle-dass hypotheses face 
somc uncxpccted an omalies in light of our data-anomalies which 
thcy do not consider implicitly or explicitly. In order to increase 
their explanatory power, these hypotheses must be reforrnulated. 
Thcy should not only be able to account for the interactions 
between social dass and confession (something the radicalization 
and thc protest hypothescs werc unablc to do), but thcy should 
also be able to give reasons for the striking differences in NSDAP 
affinity bctwccn thc sclf-cmployed and the salaricd middlc dasscs 
of the non-Catholic majority of the Weimar electorate. 
The anomalies of the rniddle-dass hypothesis in respect to 
thc votc ofProtestant workers constitute evidence in favor ofthe 
mixed-causes hypothesis, which can be reconciled with a weak 
version of thc middlc-class hypothesis: Therc is clcar cvidcncc 
that the Hitler movement -clrew its vote mainly, but not exclu-
sively, from the Protestant rniddle dass, and that there was also 
a strong influx of working-class votcs. What rcmains to bc tcstcd 
is whether any difference can be found between the character of 
thc Nazi vote coming from the middle dass and the character of 
the Nazi vote coming from the working dass. Thc qucstion of 
idcological radicalization, forrnation, and protest is addrcsscd aftcr 
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Table 1 Voting Disposition of the Social Classes in Weimar Germany, I920-
I933 (Row Percentages) 
KPD SPD z/BVP 
27.8 
7·4 
I2.2 
DNVP 
r6.J 
9.0 
9.6 
LIB OTHER 
0.0 
5-4 
NSDAP NONVOT 
I920 SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I 924a SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I924b SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I 9 2 8 SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I 9 3 0 SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I 9 3 2a SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I 9 3 2 b SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I9J3 SELFEMPL 
WH COL 
BLU COL 
I. I 7· 8 
!.7 21.6 
2.I 20.9 
0.0 6.5 
4·7 I5·9 
r8.6 21.3 
0.0 4·6 
3.1 2I.8 
IJ.2 29.4 
0.0 6.7 
5.2 24.0 
IJ.9 31.1 · 
0.0 8.0 
6.0 23·5 
I9.5 25.7 
0.0 6.6 
5.8 24·4 
22.5 22.2 
0.0 6.5 
7·5 21.6 
24·7 I9·9 
0.0 5·4 
6.2 20.9 
19.7 20.4 
LID = DDP and OVP voters combined. 
27.0 
8.9 
9·4 
)0.9 
8.2 
9.9 
IJ.J 
7.9 
IO. I 
I9.9 
8.9 
9.6 
20.4 
10.0 
I0.8 
18.7 
9.1 
IO.O 
17.9 
9.7 
10.9 
18.3 
I3. 7 
IJ.2 
I9.6 
I 5.2 
IJ. 5 
IJ.J 
9·9 
9· I 
6.1 
6.6 
j. I 
5· 5 
6.4 
).8 
7·9 
9·4 
4·4 
7·5 
9·4 
5· 5 
19.0 
29.6 
II.O 
11.6 
17·7 
7·5 
IJ.9 
20.0 
8.2 
10.5 
17.0 
6.] 
J.I 
12.2 
3·7 
1.9 
2.7 
I.J 
2.4 
3. 5 
1.4 
!.7 
2.7 
1.2 
28.3 
4.6 
5.6 
6.4 
2.8 
2.8 
j.6 
I4.7 
5. 5 
10.0 
I6.2 
6.0 
10.7 
3.0 
2.5 
2.) 
3. 5 
2.7 
2.4 
1.8 
1.7 
I. I 
O.I 
0.2 
0.2 
5·5 
7.0 
].8 
2.8 
2.8 
r.8 
2.4 
2.3 
I. 5 
I 8. I 
I6.o 
12.0 
41.7 
29.I 
24.5 
35.8 
24.6 
20.9 
jJ. I 
34·5 
31. I 
27.9 
2j. I 
Ij.J 
26.6 
26.5 
19.8 
25·4 
26.2 
I8.5 
35· I 
28.2 
IJ.8 
24.6 
20.8 
1).8 
20.9 
19.I 
I2.6 
2j.l 
21.4 
I6.2 
12.6 
14.8 
10.2 
Percentages were computed by means of multiple regression analysis; urbanization and religous 
dcnomination wcre controUed for the county data set. 
our discussion of whcther dissolution or mobilization was the 
predominant feature of the process. 
Mobilization or dissolution? Although the mass hypotheses 
were rejected above in their gcncral version, they could still be 
true in a mobilization version. If the nonvoters (the "unpolitical") 
wcre concentrated in one segment of society, the gcneral mobi-
lization of nonvoters would Iead to a predominance of this seg-
ment in the NS vote even if a/1 formcr nonvotcrs had the same 
strong disposition to vote NS. If we take a Iook at our data, 
neither this version of the mass hypothcscs nor the mobilization 
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Table z Voting Disposition of the Social Strata by Confession (Row Percent-
ages) 
KPD SPD ZIBVP DNVP LIB OTHEI\ NSDAP NONVOT 
1920 CATHIND !.6 9-I 45-9 7.0 I I. I 7-9 0.2 17-4 
CATHWCOL 2.2 r8. 5 !6.4 ll.2 20.6 9-3 0.2 2!.5 
CATHBCOL !.9 !!.0 24.2 7.6 9· I I 5·3 0.2 30-7 
OTHIND !.2 9-9 !!.6 !9.7 23.0 0.0 0.2 34·5 
OTHWCOL 1.5 19.5 8.2 8.8 27-9 6.6 0.2 27-4 
OTHBCOL 2.0 25.0 8. 3 II.6 I4.8 29-7 0. I 8.5 
1924a CATHIND 2.5 8. I 48.0 4-9 8. 3 4·8 4·3 19.2 
CATHWCOL s.8 !2.6 !0.8 !2.6 !!.I 5· I 8.8 33 ·I 
CATHBCOL I5.9 8.3 20.9 I!.7 6.9 7·0 ].2 26.I 
OTHIND 0.0 5-7 I !.9 26.6 IJ.O 4·6 6. I ]2.2 
OTHWCOL j. I I6.s 1!.2 IJ.9 20. I 6.2 5-2 2!.8 
OTHBCOL I8.s 27.2 4·6 IJ.8 8. 3 5-9 4·5 I7.2 
I924b CATHIND 3-7 8.4 5!.2 5.2 8.9 4-l 2.3 r6. I 
CATHWCOL 5-3 I7-3 ro.5 I5.9 !2. 3 4-3 ].6 ]0.7 
CATHBCOL 8.7 II.2 25. I !!.7 S.g s.6 2. I 26.6 
OTHIND 0.0 5-0 14.3 27.6 I6.2 2.4 2.8 JI.8 
OTHWCOL J.J 2!.4 I2. I I4. I 2!.6 2.8 2.2 22.5 
OTHBCOL IJ. 3 ]6. 8 ].8 14-9 g.o 5· I !.9 I5.2 
I928 CATHIND 5· I IO.j 30.] 6.6 8.7 !2.9 2.2 2].8 
CATHWCOL 5-9 !7.7 II.6 10.9 I0.6 8.I J.O J2.2 
CATHBCOL 9.0 I6.3 17.8 !0.4 8.7 9·7 !.9 26.] 
OTHIND 0.0 8.3 6.7 I6.7 Il.J IJ.6 2.4 4!.0 
OTHWCOL 5.8 24.9 9-I 9.6 I7-7 6.5 !.7 24.6 
OTHBCOL I3.8 J6.I 7-3 8.8 6.J 10.6 1.6 I5.4 
I930 CATHIND 5-4 I0.2 35·4 4-I 6.4 rr.8 9-0 I7-5 
CATHWCOL 7.0 I7-7 12.6 6.I 7-6 9.8 I9.2 20.0 
CATHBCOL I4.2 I2.7 I7.0 6.8 6.2 !0.7 I I. I 21.4 
OTHIND 0.0 9-l 6.9 7-5 7·3 17-3 2J.4 zB.s 
OTHWCOL 7.2 24.0 IO. I 6.7 I2.8 5.8 !2.4 2!.I 
OTHBCOL I9. I J0.7 7-5 4·2 3-3 rr.6 13.4 !0.7 
I9J2a CATHIND 6.0 IO.I 39-0 4·4 2.! 3·1 !6.6 I8.7 
CATHWCOL 7.6 I 5· 7 IJ.2 5.8 2-4 ].2 31.3 20.8 
CATHBCOL !7.8 13.7 2!.4 5-7 !.9 J. I 19·3 I7. I 
OTHIND 0.0 7-I 6.4 6.0 !.7 2.8 54-8 2!.2 
OTHWCOL 7.0 z6.8 li -3 6.4 2.6 2.] 26. I 17-5 
OTHBCOL 2!.5 25.0 6.8 J. I !.I 2.0 28.9 11.6 
I9J2b CATHIND 7-5 9-7 ]4.0 5-7 2.5 J.J 15.2 22.0 
CATHWCOL 8.7 I4.0 rz.5 7-6 2.9 3-3 25.8 25-3 
CATHBCOL I7-7 I2.9 I9.I 6.9 2.J ].2 17-7 20.2 
OTHIND 0.0 7-5 6.5 8.8 2.J J.2 45-9 25.9 
OTHWCOL 9.2 23-5 10.5 9-5 3-3 2.7 22.9 I8.4 
OTHBCOL 24.0 22.0 6.7 4·0 l.J 2.2 24. I I 5.8 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
KPD SPD 
1933 CATHIND 6.9 IO.O 
CATHWCOL 8.0 I4. I 
CATHBCOL IJ. I 12.9 
OTHIND 0.0 5·9 
OTHWCOL 7·3 22.5 
OTHBCOL 19·3 22.4 
LIB = DDP and DVP voters combined. 
CATHIND = Catholic lndependents 
CATHWCOL = Catholic White Collar 
CATHBCOL = Catholic Blue Collar 
OTHIND = Non-Catholic Independents 
OTHWCOL = Non-Catholic White Collar 
OTHBCOL = Non-Catholic Blue Collar 
z/BVP 
33· I 
12.7 
21.5 
6.4 
II.2 
6.5 
DNVP LIB OTHER NSDAP 
6.2 2.0 r.8 27.0 
8.0 2.2 1.9 ]8.9 
7·5 r.8 r.8 27.6 
8.0 1.5 r.6 64·7 
9·5 2.5 r.6 30.8 
5.0 I. I 0.9 35· 8 
vcrsion of any other hypothesis seems to be supported. As tables 
r, 2, and 3 show, there is some difference between the percentage 
of nonvoters for different social groups, but ncither this differcnce 
nor its development over time indicates disproportional mobili-
zation. In addition, the fluctuation bctwccn pairs of succcssivc 
elections ·indicatcs clearly that "dissolution" is more in accordance 
with the facts than mobilization (see Tables 4 and 5). The group 
of nonvoters is by no means less stable than other groups of 
voters, as an inspection of thc main diagonals rcvcals; thc dispo-
sition of this group to switch to the NSDAP is greater than this 
dispostion for voters of the KPD and the SPD, for instance, but 
less than the NS-disposition of DDP/DVP and DNVP voters; 
only the net flow over time of former nonvoters to the NSDAP 
constitutes a figure of importance (sec Table 6). 12 
In combination with the evidence on the social basis of the 
Weimar party system, these findings Iead to thc conclusion that 
the mass hypothesis is uncorroborated if not refuted by the facts. 
For the remairring hypotheses, we have to keep in mind that some 
mobilization in favor of the NSDAP took place, but that there is 
no evidence of exclusive or even dominant mobilization cffccts. 
12 For further dctails, sce idem, "National-Socialist Mobilization." 
NONVOT 
IJ.I 
14.2 
IJ.9 
I2.0 
I4.6 
9.0 
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Table 3 The Voting Disposition of the Catholics and Non-Carholies in Weimar 
Germany, 1920-I933 (Row Percentages) 
KPD SPD z/BVP DNVP LIB OTHER NSDAP 
I920 CATH. 1.4 8.0 48·5 o.s 5·8 !0.0 0.5 
NON-CATH. !.8 2l.I 0.6 I7.0 23.I I6.5 0.0 
I924a CATH. 8.6 4-5 42-5 2.7 3·4 4·7 ].2 
NON-CATH. I0.2 20.7 I.7 20.8 14.6 6.I 5-9 
I928 CATH. 4·8 9-0 36-7 3.6 4-0 9·5 r.8 
NON-CATH. g.o 28.0 0 I4.0 I2.7 I I. I 2.0 
I930 CATH. 7·9 7·4 J9.2 2.3 3·0 9.8 9· I 
NON-CATH. II.6 25·4 0.0 7·4 8.] I2.3 17.6 
I932a CATH. !0.2 6.4 41.8 2. I 0.7 2.9 I6.o 
NON-CATH. I2.6 23. I 0. I 6.2 2.3 2.4 38.2 
I9]2b CATH. I0.7 5.8 38-7 2.3 0.9 2.7 13.7 
NON-CATI!. I4- 3 20.9 0. I 8.7 2.8 2.8 32.6 
I933 CATH. 7.6 6.0 39-0 3.0 0.6 1.4 28.2 
NON-CA TU. I2.0 20.4 0.] 8.9 2.2 1.4 43-9 
LIB = DDP and DVP votcrs con1bined. 
Analysis of voting transitions between parlies The first hy-
pothesis we have to discuss here is the realignment hypothesis: 
According to Meckstroth, the economic crisis first instigated in-
stability and then, through habitualization, led to a new stability. 
Electoral volatility, therefore, should be significantly higher be-
tween 1928 and 1932 than before or after this period of realign-
ment. Electoral volatility may be measured either by the mean 
deviation from the diagonal of our transition tables or by the 
mean stability of parties in each pair of elections. Both measures 
are equivalent. Since we are interested in dispositions for change 
(or stability), we calculated the arithmetic means of the diagonals 
of our seven fluctuation tables (see Table 5). Meckstroth seems to 
be right when we compare the two pairs of elections between 
1928 and July 1932 to the successive two pairs. The mean stability 
of the two pairs of elections after July 1932 is 54. 5, whereas the 
mean stability for the preceding two pairs is 46.7. If we Iook back 
to the three pairs of elections between 1920 and 1928, the mean 
stability again is lower than that for the "realignment period," 
NONVOT 
25.4 
Ig.8 
30-5 
20.0 
30-4 
23.2 
21.3 
I7·4 
I9.9 
I 5· I 
25.I 
!7.8 
I4. I 
!0.9 
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Table 4 Voter Movements Between Consecutive Elections, I92D-I928 
(Row Percentages; Community-Level Data). 
ELECTION I924a 
ELECTION 
I920 KPD SPD z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 19 I2 12 Il 13 8 7 I7 2 
SPD Il 42 6 10 I2 6 3 9 I7 
z/BVP 6 5 50 5 7 4 4 17 ll 
LIB 6 I5 8 30 25 0 8 l4 I7 
DNVP 4 9 8 4 48 9 8 IO I2 
OTHER 2I 19 6 8 7 IJ 6 20 20 
NSDAP 
NONVOT 6 2 6 6 IO 3 58 22 
ALL 9 15 II Il I5 IO 5 24 
ELECTION 1924b 
ELECTION 
I924a KPD SPD z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 4I 19 6 7 6 2 17 9 
SPD 0 81 4 5 4 I 3 I5 
z/BVP 2 5 70 4 4 2 ro II 
LIB 4 6 2 66 3 2 I6 I! 
DNVP 3 6 2 4 70 0 3 13 I5 
OTHER 6 9 6 7 7 40 3 21 10 
NSDAP 8 IJ 9 14 27 9 I3 7 
NONVOT 9 10 6 6 7 57 24 
ALL 7 20 IJ !2 r6 8 2 22 
ELECTION I928 
ELECTION 
1924b KPD SPD z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 52 I6 7 9 8 4 2 2 7 
SPD 6 79 2 4 I 6 I 20 
z/BVP 3 7 55 5 6 10 2 I3 12 
LIB 3 5 5 45 2 I5 3 22 12 
DNVP 4 10 6 4 51 I! 12 !6 
OTHER 4 7 31 6 6 29 3 15 8 
NSDAP 5 I7 1J 12 9 r8 8 I9 2 
NONVOT 5 4 0 2 7 2 78 22 
ALL 8 22 I2 10 I I I! 2 26 
LIB == DDP and DVP voters combincd. 
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Table 5 Voter Movements Between Consecutive Elections, 1928-1933 
(Row Percentages; County-Level Data). 
ELECTION I9JO 
ELECTION 
1928 KPD SPD ziBvP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 57 5 4 4 7 7 12 8 
SPD 7 68 4 3 2 10 5 22 
z/BVP 7 0 66 3 2 9 9 4 12 
LIB 2 !0 6 3 I 5 IO 26 I I IO 
DNVP 5 5 3 27 I! 3 I 16 II 
OTHER 5 IO IO 5 7 47 I! 7 II 
NSDAP 9 12 9 5 3 13 38 II 2 
NONVOT 9 7 6 6 2 8 14 so 26 
ALL 10 20 I] 7 6 li 15 I9 
ELECTION I932a 
ELECTION 
I930 KPD SPD z/svP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 58 !I 9 4 9 2 5 IO 10 
SPD 9 6] 3 2 16 5 20 
Z(BVP 6 7 65 I 2 10 5 I] 
LIB 5 I8 11 6 I2 2 ]6 II 7 
DNVP 8 I I 7 2 20 33 I7 6 
OTHER 7 9 2 8 9 49 16 I! 
NSDAP 2 2 4 0 ss 0 IS 
NONVOT 8 6 2 19 57 I9 
ALL I2 I8 14 2 ]1 I7 
ELECTION I9]2b 
ELECTION 
I932a KPD SPD z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 66 6 5 2 4 2 4 I I I2 
SPD 10 67 5 2 5 2 6 4 18 
z/BVP 7 5 6] 5 3 6 9 14 
LIB I8 13 !I 15 10 7 4 24 2 
DNVP 9 8 10 3 49 5 0 16 5 
OTHER 13 10 !] 5 9 22 II I8 3 
NSDAP 3 5 4 3 I 76 6 ]I 
NONVOT 4 2 2 5 2 2 81 17 
ALL IJ I6 1] 2 7 27 20 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
ELECTION 1933 
ELECTION 
19J2b KPD SPD z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NSDAP NONVOT ALL 
KPD 62 7 7 2 7 9 6 
SPD 2 78 3 2 3 6 6 
ZIBVP 4 74 2 5 2 3 6 
LIB 14 !6 II 12 10 4 23 10 
DNVP 3 0 4 3 49 2 34 6 
OTHER 9 17 8 4 12 II 33 6 
NSDAP 2 0 92 2 
NONVOT 2 4 7 2 2 42 41 
ALL I I 16 13 2 7 2 39 12 
LIB = DDP and DVP voters combined. 
falling slightly below 40. If we accept the notion that electoral 
volatility is a valid indicator of realignment, then the realignment 
period might have started much earlier than Meckstroth has as-
sumed. 
The picture changes slightly, if we consider only the stability 
of the middle-class parties, that is, DNVP, LIB (DDP/DVP), 
OTHER, NSDAP and, for totally pragmatic reasons, the Non-
vaters. Then the mean stability of this "camp" between 1928 and 
July 1932 was marginally lower than that of the preceding period 
(3T37- 3) and considerably lower than that of the following two 
pairs of elections (37=44-8). A realignment might indeed have 
taken place; but, if so, it was more or less restricted to the "po-
litically unchurched" voters of the middle-class parties, and it 
seems to have started in the 1920-1928 period. Recoined in this 
way, the realignment hypothesis becomes indistinguishable from 
the middle-class and the mixed-causes hypotheses as far as the 
process of change is concerned. Since there were no elections 
from 1933 to 1948, we will never be able to determine ifthe nine-
month period betweenJuly 1932 and March 1933 can legitimately 
be called a new state of normality. In any event, there is evidence 
that it might be more fruitful to inspect electoral change on a 
group Ievel than on the Ievel of the total electorate. In order to 
do so we summarily characterize each party's electoral fortune 
during the Weimar Republic. 
13 
16 
13 
2 
7 
3 
27 
20 
Table 6 Fluctuation between NSDAP and Other Parries 
ELECTION KPD SPD Z/BVP LIB DNVP OTHER NONVOT 
20/24a O.IJ:O.OO o.ss : 0.00 o.6o : o.oo I.26 : 0.00 I.OO : 0.00 0.90: 0.00 0.53 : 0.00 
24a/24b 0.25 : 0.39 o.r5: o.66 0.26 : 0.45 0.26 : 0.70 0.37:I.33 0.25 : 0.47 0.19:0.33 
2<j.b/28 0.14-: 0.10 0.20 : 0.]4 0.24- : 0.26 0.]6 : 0.24 0.16: 0.!8 0.24 : 0.]6 0.44: 0.]8 
28/30 0.40:0.!8 2.20 : 0.24 r.o8:o.r8 2.60 : 0. IO 3.41 : 0.06 1.2! : 0.25 J.64: 0.22 
J0/]2a 0.50: 0.]0 ].20: 0.]0 I.JO: 0.60 2. 53 : 0. I 5 1.98: 0.75 5·4-0: 0.0 ].]6: 0.0 
32a/]2b 0.48 : 0.93 1.08 : I. 55 0.84: 1.24 o.o8:o.Jr 0.0 : 0.9] O.JJ: O.JI 0.]4:1.86 
pb/JJ 1.17:0.54 0.96 : 0.27 0.]9: 0.27 0.46 : 0.27 2.]8: 0.81 0.99: 0.0 8.40 : 0. 54 
ua = DDP and DVP voters combined. 
Numbers indicatc the percentage of cligible voters who switchcd from onc election to the next toward the NSDAP from the 
party given at the head of the column (first number) and those who went thc other way (sccond number). 
o.oo represents genuine zeros; 0.0 is the result of the proportional fitting procedure (sec n. 10). 
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Communist Party: Starting from small beginnings, the 
KPD eventually held a stable share of the vote, about ro percent 
of the electorate. The loyalty of its voters (as measured by the 
main diagonals of each subtable of Table 4) grew consistently 
from 19 percent to over 6o percent. The disposition of its voters 
to switch to the NSDAP was low (always less than 10 percent), 
and the NSDAP never ranked high among the alternatives (the 
NSDAP was the leading alternative only in the last election; in 
all other elections, it was at best the fifth-ranking alternative). 
The asymmetry in dispositions was low, and the net fiow very 
small (see Table 6}. We can therefore conclude that the NSDAP 
did not really affect the KPD voters. Whether they were radicals 
or protesters, the NSDAP to them constituted neither another 
way of expressing their convictions nor another outlet for protest. 
Social Democrarie Party: The SPD, too, kept a stable 
share of the electorate (between 15 and 22 percent}. The loyalty 
of its voters was even higher (in the end over 75 percent}. Until 
1928, the disposition of SPD voters to switch to the NSDAP as 
well as the rank of the NSDAP as an alternative was low; after 
1928, the NSDAP was as important as the KPD as an alternative 
and ranked first or second. There was asymmetry in dispositions 
and a substantial net flow of votes toward the NSDAP. If we 
Iook at the proportion ofSPD voters who were disposed to switch 
to radical parties in general (NSDAP, KPD, and DNVP}, we find 
stability and even a reduction during the last three pairs of elec-
tions (26, 21, and rr percent). All features taken together, we 
conclude that the NSDAP became simply another protest outlet 
for SPD voters after 1928. 
Zentrum/BVP: The stability of the share and the loyalty 
of voters of the Center party and the Bavarian People's party 
were comparable to those of the SPD vote. The disposition to 
switch to the NSDAP and the rank of the NSDAP as an alter-
native were quite low except for two elections (1930 and 1932a). 
The asymmetry was low, and the net flow marginal. Here, as for 
the SPD, the combined propensities to switch to radical parties 
were stable and falling in the last elections (21, 18, and 13 percent). 
The behavior of the voters of Zentrum/BVP with respect to the 
NSDAP is best characterized as "temporary irritation." Radical-
ization did not occur and the NSDAP did not prove to be a Iasting 
means of protest for Catholic voters. 
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LIB (DDP/DVP): There was a clear loss of votes over 
time, from 17 percent of the electorate in the beginning to 2 
percent in the last elections. The loyalty was only moderate in 
the first elections and exceptionally low in the later ones. The 
disposition to switch to the NSDAP rose dramatically from 1928 
to 1930, and the NSDAP became by far the most attractive alter-
native, in two elcctions ranking higher than DDP/DVP them-
selves. Thc asymmetry was high except in thc end, and the nct 
flow of votcs to the NSDAP was substantial. If we again Iook at 
the combincd propensities to vote for radical parties, we find vcry 
high figures for thc last four elections, with thc right wing partics 
dominating. This shift is a clear instancc of a onc-sided movemcnt 
consistcnt with "radicalization." 
DNVP: The picture is about thc same as for the liberals. 
The share of the vote fell from a high of r6 perccnt in 1928 to 7 
percent in 1933. The loyalty of DNVP votcrs was somewhat 
higher than for the DDP and the DVP, but still only moderate. 
From 1930 on, thc NSDAP was the preferrcd alternative; in two 
elections it ranked cvcn higher than the DNVP itself. Thc asym-
metry was high, and the net ftow substantial. The combined 
propensities of DNVP voters to rcmain with the DNVP or to 
switch to other radical parties were always high, the Communist 
party playing a minor role and the NSDAP gaining weight ovcr 
time. The fate of the DNVP was similar to that of the DDP and 
the DVP, as far as the NSDAP is concerned. Since the DNVP is 
classified in this analysis as a radical party, instead of using the 
Iabel "radicalization" we call the movement of its voters "further 
radicalization." 
If wc put all of the pieces together, we can now discuss the 
hypotheses concerning the overall character of the change in voter 
behavior during the Weimar Republic. To explore the voting 
patterns of the middle dass, we have to choose among middle-
class-protest, middle-class-formation (equal radicalization of all 
Protestant middle-class voters), and middle-class-ideological-rad-
icalization (differences among different groups). The movement 
to the NSDAP of the voters of all of the parties under study is 
so onc-sided that we can exclude middle-class-protest immcdi-
ately and consider only the other two versions. Although the 
ideological-radicalization hypothesis claims consistently stronger 
movements from the DDP and DVP to the NSDAP than from 
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the conservative DNVP, there should be no such differences ac-
cording to the formation hypothesis. The evidence shows no 
marked differences between the two liberal parties and the DNVP 
before 1933, thereby refuting the claims ofthe middle-class-ideo-
logical-radicalization hypothesis and corroborating, at least in ten-
dency, the "middle dass formation" hypothesis. 
As far as the influx of working-class votes is concerned, we 
find clear evidence that the process behind it was different from 
that for the middle dass. A mixed-causes hypothesis in the form 
of middle-class-formation plus working-class-protest is fully sup-
ported by our data. The data also indicate that our hypothesis has 
to be refined considerably-the difference between KPD voters 
and SPD voters hints that ideology played a major role. In terms 
of our theoretical considerations, we can suggest how to refine 
the mixed-causes hypothesis. 
Conclusions Extremely simplified, the economic crisis led 
to a transformation of the social mapping of the Weimar party 
system. As Figure 6 shows, two phases can be discerned. 
Fig. 6. Political Change in Weimar Germany 
left 
right 
left 
right 
Phase 1: Bcforc r 928 
"System" Parties Opposition to the "System" 
SPD------1------ KPD 
DDP DNVP 
DVP-----+-------.,NSDAP 
Phase li: From 1928 Onward 
"System" Partics Opposition to the "System" 
(DDP) 
(DVP) 
(DNVP) 
======~======~--NSDAP 
NOTE: Zentrum/BVP is excludcd from this figure since denomination obviously was 
the salient issue for thc voters of these parties, which made them stable clients. 
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In phase I, those opposed to the "systcm" took the left-right 
dimcnsion into account. For those still supporting the system, a 
combination of the system-dimension and the left-right dimension 
was salient; thcy crossed cither the systems boundary or the dass 
boundary, but not both. In phase I!, whcn the cconomic crisis 
dominared every other issue, positional differences were affected 
in different ways. For thosc who were opposed to the system, 
nothing changed at all. For those not opposing the system, thc 
Jeft-right dimension was salient in different ways. Workers who 
defected from the SPD and voiccd thcir protest no Ionger were 
reluctant to cross the left-right dimension, whereas members of 
the Protestant middlc dass lost thcir inhibition agairrst crossing 
the systems boundary but clearly were reluctant to cross the left-
right dimension. 
The growth of the NSDAP was neither an instance of re-
warding-punishing bchavior of thc electorate nor the effect of 
mass radicalization. The way that the economic crisis was trans-
formcd into a political crisis was comp]ex, but not beyond recon-
struction. Satisfactory explanations of thc clectoral rise of N azism 
after I 928 call for more encompassing and data-oriented hy-
potheses than thosc normally givcn by electoral historians. 
